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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) only allows drugs in the 
marketplace after pharmaceutical companies prove that they are both 
“safe” and “effective.”1  Once the FDA approves a drug, doctors can 
legally prescribe the drug in any manner they choose.  The FDA does not 
regulate the practice of medicine, and “physicians are free to prescribe 
‘any legally marketed device’ for uses other than those approved by the 
FDA.”2  Physicians have this freedom under the premise that it allows 
them “to provide the best-available treatments when the FDA approval 
process does not keep pace with medical advancements or when rare 
diseases do not affect enough patients to economically justify 
manufacturers’ seeking FDA approval for new uses to treat these 
diseases.”3  In fact, doctors often prescribe drugs for medical indications 
other than the FDA tested and approved uses in a practice known as “off-
label” drug use.4 
To maximize profits, major pharmaceutical companies (“pharma”) 
primarily rely on two disparate business practices  innovation and 
marketing.
5
  Obviously, discovering additional uses for pre-existing 
drugs can result in an expanded market and increased profits for these 
products.  However, it is illegal for pharma to actively market these “off-
label” uses without securing FDA approval for these additional 
indications.  Pharma, however, can conduct research outside of the FDA 
regulatory process to discover additional uses for a specific drug.  In 
turn, these studies on alternative uses might persuade doctors to prescribe 
the drug in an off-label manner, but only if doctors become aware that 
such off-label uses are medically indicated.
6
  How this off-label usage 
information reaches doctors is a contentious legal point.
7
  There is a fine 
line “between drug companies providing information about possible off-
label uses and drug companies promoting use in a manner not sanctioned 
by the [FDA].”8 
 
 1. 21 C.F.R. § 310.301 (2006); see George S. Craft, Jr., Promoting Off-Label in 
Pursuit of Profit: An Examination of a Fraudulent Business Model, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. 
& POL’Y 103, 104 (2007). 
 2. Craft, supra note 1, at 105 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006 & Supp. 2010)). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Anique Gonzalez, Drug Companies and “Off-Label” Marketing, GEN. 
COUNSEL CONSULTING, http://bit.ly/RgGaLK (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
 5. Craft, supra note 1, at 104.  In this article, when the authors use the term 
“pharma,” they are referring to multi-national pharmaceutical companies that principally 
rely on patented drugs, as opposed to generic drugs, for their profits. 
 6. See Craft, supra note 1, at 108-09. 
 7. See id. at 105-06. 
 8. Gonzalez, supra note 4. 
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Belying pharma’s claims that drugs cost so much because of 
research and development (R&D) expenses, over the past decade, drug 
manufacturers have spent approximately twice as much on marketing 
existing drugs than on R&D for new drugs.
9
  In 2002, before the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) began actively investigating the prevalence 
of off-label marketing,
10
 the ten largest pharmaceutical companies spent 
31 percent of their revenues on marketing.
11
  Comparatively, these same 
ten companies spent only 14 percent on R&D.
12
  Given these statistics, it 
comes as no surprise that a 2001 study revealed that doctors prescribed 
drugs in an off-label manner 21 percent of the time.
13
  However, the truly 
alarming fact associated with this finding is that 73 percent of these off-
label drug usages had little or no scientific support.
14
  In other words, the 
vast majority of off-label prescriptions imposed unnecessary medical 
risks on patients and unnecessary financial costs on payors (i.e., patients, 
private insurers, self-insured employers, Medicare, and Medicaid). 
A major reason for the high prevalence of off-label usage is the 
rigorous clinical testing imposed by the FDA for a new drug application 
(NDA).  In its role as “market gatekeeper,” the FDA will reject an NDA 
if: (1) the accompanying submitted reports “do not include adequate tests 
by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not such drug is 
safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended or suggested 
in the proposed labeling thereof”;15 (2) “the results of such tests show 
that such drug is unsafe for use under such conditions or do not show that 
such drug is safe for use under such conditions”;16 or (3) ”there is a lack 
of substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is 
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof.”17  In other 
words, the FDA will not accept a NDA unless there is substantial 
evidence that regulators could fairly and responsibly conclude that the 
 
 9. Craft, supra note 1, at 104. 
 10. In the latter part of the decade, pharmaceutical giants Pfizer and Eli Lilly & Co. 
settled civil and criminal lawsuits in excess of $1.4 billion each, and smaller companies 
settled suits for hundreds of millions of dollars.  See Melly Alazraki, Pfizer Pays a 
Record $2.3 Billion to Settle Criminal Charges, DAILYFINANCE.COM (Sept. 2, 2009, 
3:00 PM), http://aol.it/4WMzB. 
 11. Craft, supra note 1, at 104. 
 12. Id. at 104-05. 
 13. David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 
166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006), available at http://bit.ly/RR413E. 
 14. Id. 
 15. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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drug will have the effect it purports to have under the conditions of use 
prescribed or recommended in its proposed labeling.
18
 
Given the costly and time-consuming process for obtaining FDA 
approval for off-label uses, coupled with the flexibility in the practice of 
“medical arts,” pharma has limited incentive to submit market-approved 
products for additional FDA testing.  In fact, if an approved drug has a 
large off-label market, there is a significant financial risk for drug 
manufacturers in seeking FDA validation for these uses.  If the clinical 
trials reveal negative safety or efficacy data, the already established off-
label market for the drug would cease to exist.  Consequently, there is a 
substantial gap in reliable scientific data supporting the safety and 
efficacy of drugs used in an off-label manner.
19
 
As a result of the decreased safety and efficacy in off-label 
prescribing, the FDA, DOJ, and the Office of Inspector General of the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (OIG) have pursued 
stringent investigations of pharma.
20
  These three bodies have prosecuted 
manufacturers guilty of illegal off-label promotion as violations of the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) and the federal False 
Claims Act (FCA).
21
  Investigations in the past five years have led to 
payouts by Pfizer and Eli Lilly, two titans in the industry, of $2.3 billion 
and $1.42 billion, respectively.
22
  Moreover, since 2004, “Pfizer, Eli 
Lilly & Co., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., and four other drug companies 
have paid a total of $7 billion in fines and penalties.”23  However, at the 
same time, from 2001 to 2008, Pfizer made $16.8 billion in revenue from 
selling the medicines it was fined for, and Eli Lilly made $36 billion in 
revenue from off-label prescribing of a single drug between 2000 and 
2008.
24
  Emphasizing not just the profitability but prevalence of off-label 
sales, in 2002, Pfizer earned $2.27 billion from sales of a drug Neurontin, 
of which $2.12 billion (approximately 94 percent of overall sales for the 
drug) came from off-label use.
25
  While these fines may seem staggering 
in isolation, their deterrent effect pales in comparison with the huge 
financial profits stemming from off-label marketing.  As an amoral 
 
 18. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 717, 730-31 (2005). 
 19. Id. at 731. 
 20. Craft, supra note 1, at 105. 
 21. See id. at 107-08, 112-15; see also John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A 
Comparative Perspective on Regulating Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 299, 308-14 (2010). 
 22. Alazraki, supra note 10. 
 23. David Evans, Pfizer Broke the Law by Promoting Drugs for Unapproved Uses, 
Bloomberg (Nov. 9, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://bloom.bg/1y6tDl. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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economic actor, pharma could conclude that such fines are a “cost of 
doing business” and not substantially change their illegal business 
practices.
26
 
This article will discuss the current state of off-label medicine, 
relevant legislation in the area, and a proposal designed to capture the 
benefits of off-label medicine while limiting its dangers when practiced 
perniciously.  Part II will discuss the regulations in place governing off-
label promotion and will detail the practice of ghostwriting and its 
associated concerns.  Part III will analyze the costs and benefits of off-
label marketing and practice of medicine, and will utilize a case study to 
demonstrate the predicament of drug manufacturers.  Part IV will set 
forth a proposal to use the newly created Patient-Centered Outcomes 
Research Institute to generate unbiased research on off-label uses, which, 
in turn, would create a safe harbor for drug companies to widely 
disseminate studies generated through this process to the medical 
community.  Finally, Part V will present concluding thoughts on the 
overarching policy considerations driving the need for legislative reform. 
II. OFF-LABEL MARKETING: A TALE OF REGULATORY FAILURE 
The FDA serves as the gatekeeper when it comes to ensuring that 
drug manufacturers abide by federal regulations and properly submit 
their drugs for testing.  Although the FDA does not have the authority to 
prevent medical practitioners from prescribing previously approved 
drugs for off-label purposes, it has statutory authority over pharma’s 
marketing of such drugs and uses this authority to prevent manufacturers 
from engaging in illegal off-label promotion.
27
 
The FDA draws its statutory authority to regulate the sale and 
marketing of drugs in the U.S. via the FDCA.
28
  The FDCA bestows 
substantial authority upon the FDA to determine the safety and efficacy 
of all “new” (including approved drugs that are being marketed for an 
unapproved use) drugs prior to marketing and to regulate a new drug’s 
proposed labeling to ensure that it is not false or misleading.
29
  
“Labeling” is a term of art that encompasses more than simply the 
external label on a bottle; it is defined under the FDCA to include all 
tangible material that accompanies a drug.
30
  Specifically, labeling 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 733. 
 28. Osborn, supra note 21, at 308 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (2006)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.; see also Richard C. Ascroft, The Impact of the Washington Legal 
Foundation Cases on Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Practices in the United States, 34 
IND. L. REV. 95, 100 (2000). 
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“includes the product’s package insert and promotional materials, 
including the detailing brochures used by the manufacturer to promote 
sales of the product”;31 thus, this broad language allows the FDA to 
control the marketing and promotion of new drugs. 
Investigations surrounding off-label promotion have relied on two 
theories under the FDCA.  The first theory contends that off-label 
promotion constitutes misbranding, meaning that the product contains 
inadequate directions for the unapproved use or that the manufacturer has 
supplied “false or misleading” information concerning the product.32  
The second theory rests on a separate conception of misbranding, 
maintaining that “it constitutes the introduction of an unapproved new 
drug into interstate commerce.”33 
A. Legal Implications of FDA’s Broad Definition of “Labeling” 
Regarding the first theory pertaining to false or misleading 
information, the FDCA specifies that the drug’s labeling may not suggest 
that it be used for any new condition that has not been approved by the 
FDA.  The FDA’s expansive reading of the term “labeling” includes 
nearly any item or information a drugmaker presents regarding a product, 
even materials that do not accompany the drug, such as promotions and 
advertisements.
34
  Thus, the FDCA’s “prohibition of false or misleading 
labeling is transformed by the [FDA] into an effective prohibition on any 
advertisement, promotional message, or discussion that is not ‘consistent 
with’ the approved product labeling . . . regardless of whether it is 
truthful or accurately reflects good medical practice.”35 
Advocates of liberal off-label usage argue that, to the extent the rule 
prohibits dissemination of information that is medically valid, it is 
illogical and harmful to the public interest.
36
  Their contention is that the 
primary rationale for off-label medicine is to allow new treatments to be 
used therapeutically well before the exhaustive FDA approval process 
would allow.  Therefore, by imposing this particular limitation, the FDA 
is frustrating the potential benefits of off-label medicine. 
However, this deregulatory position ignores the risks of relaxing 
current limitations on off-label marketing and credulously accepts the 
 
 31. Ascroft, supra note 30, at 100. 
 32. Craft, supra note 1, at 107 (quoting Jack Cinquegrana & Diana K. Lloyd, 
Shifting Perspective on Off-Label Promotion, PHARMEXEC.COM (Jan. 1, 2006), 
http://bit.ly/QNxcUg). 
 33. Id. at 108. 
 34. Osborn, supra note 21, at 308 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2012)). 
 35. Id. at 308-09. 
 36. See infra Part III (discussing the commonly identified benefits of off-label 
medicine). 
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“truthful” nature of studies funded by pharma.  As discussed below, 
pharma has become quite adept at manipulating the information 
marketplace.  One tactic instituted by pharma is the inclusion of 
contractual gag clauses to prevent clinical investigators from publishing 
unfavorable results that would negatively affect the financial interests of 
the pharmaceutical company.
37
  Merck used this tactic to suppress 
negative safety data on Vioxx, a blockbuster anti-inflammatory drug that 
it later pulled from the market because of increased risks of heart attack 
and strokes associated with long-term use of this product.
38
  Another 
troubling strategy used is “ghostwriting,” where professional writers are 
paid to create scientific publications and, in turn, researchers or doctors 
with impressive credentials are paid to attach their name and legitimacy 
to such articles.
39
  Without checking these abuses, there will remain a 
valid suspicion that dissemination of “truthful” off-label findings can 
harm patients and the practice of medicine. 
B. Liability for Introducing Products into Interstate Commerce 
The second theory under the FDCA providing for the FDA’s 
regulatory powers is that the FDCA also makes it a crime to introduce an 
unapproved new drug into interstate commerce.
40
  As previously 
mentioned, it is sometimes irrelevant that the drug has already received 
approval for marketing and distribution by the FDA because a drug is 
considered “new” when it is promoted for uses that have not been FDA 
approved.
41
 
The term “new” takes on an extended meaning—limiting the range 
of marketing and promotional activities of drug manufacturers—as a 
result of the FDA’s differentiation between “intended” and “unintended” 
uses.  “A manufacturer’s intended use includes all uses objectively 
intended by the drug manufacturer based upon statements made in 
labeling, in advertisements, or in written or oral statements by company 
representatives, and if the FDA-approved labeling does not cover each 
‘intended use’ then a drug [] is deemed misbranded.”42  Thus, although 
FDAMA allows drug manufacturers to distribute information on off-
label uses within strict limitations, the FDCA effectively counters this 
 
 37. See Robert Steinbrook, Gag Clauses in Clinical-Trial Agreements, 352 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2160, 2160 (2005) (“Sponsors with a financial interest in the outcome of 
clinical research can suppress negative results.”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Craft, supra note 1, at 108. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Osborn, supra note 21, at 309. 
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permission by requiring that each so-called intended use be FDA-
approved; otherwise, the company has violated the law by introducing a 
“misbranded” product into interstate commerce. 
C. Liability under the False Claims Act 
In addition to liability under the FDCA, a pharmaceutical company 
may also find itself in violation of the federal False Claims Act (FCA).  
The FCA makes it unlawful to “knowingly present[], or cause[] to be 
presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” by the 
government.
43
  The pharmaceutical industry contends that the application 
of the FCA to off-label promotion is convoluted because it requires 
several links to ultimately find the drug manufacturers liable.  This is a 
fair claim given the chain of liability: (1) drug companies publish and 
disseminate off-label information through peer-reviewed articles, 
medical journals, and other qualified reference publications that alert 
medical practitioners and pharmacists of the new, alternative uses of the 
already FDA-approved drugs; (2) the drug companies then sell the 
products to wholesale distributors; (3) the wholesale distributors in turn 
sell to pharmacies and other providers; and (4) these other providers in 
turn file claims with the government (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid).
44
  
The essence of this legal charge is that pharma promotional activities 
cause false claims to be submitted to the government for medically 
unnecessary off-label uses.
45
  The theory of liability is somewhat strained 
because it is not the drug manufacturer’s direct actions that subject it to 
liability.  Rather, the manufacturers’ liability is contributory because 
pharmacies and providers file claims with the government, which 
ultimately makes the manufacturers’ off-label promotion illegal under 
the FCA. 
D. The Qui Tam Suit and its Effect on FCA Liability 
Another cornerstone of the FCA is the availability of a qui tam suit, 
or whistleblower provisions, which allows individuals who are aware of 
 
 43. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2006). 
 44. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 45. Craft, supra note 1, at 113 (“These claims are based on the theory that 
manufacturers promote off-label uses of drugs, knowing that physicians will prescribe 
such uses to Medicaid patients and that these patients will seek reimbursement for these 
off-label prescriptions from Medicaid [and Medicare].”); see also Gonzalez, supra note 4 
(explaining how insurance companies, which ordinarily will only cover “medically 
necessary” prescriptions and not “experimental” medications, are now contesting the off-
label prescriptions that they were forced to cover and alleging that they lost billions of 
dollars as a result). 
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fraud against the government to file suit on the government’s behalf and 
receive a portion of the recovered funds.
46
  “Whistleblowers can file suit 
under the FCA for fraud resulting from off-label promotion due to [the] 
negative effects it has on state and federally funded programs such as 
Medicaid, which may prohibit reimbursement for off-label 
prescriptions.”47  To entice employees to blow the whistle on their 
employer’s former or current wrongdoing, those coming forth with 
information stand to collect as much as 30 percent of any settlement the 
company makes with the government.
48
 
The pertinent time in determining liability under the FCA is the date 
in which the off-label speech occurs.
49
  As with liability under the 
FDCA, the truth or medical accuracy of the information asserted and 
promoted is irrelevant under the FCA.  Moreover, even if a 
pharmaceutical company intends to seek FDA approval for the drug’s 
use, and the use later becomes FDA approved, the relevant inquiry 
focuses only on whether the information was ever marketed off-label.
50
  
In addition to this fairness critique, from a utilitarian perspective, drug 
manufacturers can argue that current FDCA and FCA limitations on off-
label promotion are too restrictive and inhibit unhealthy patients from 
receiving beneficial, potentially life-saving medicines solely because 
they have not passed the lengthy and arguably inefficient FDA approval 
process. 
A separate fairness argument for drug manufacturers is that 
whistleblowers are over-incentivized.  Whistleblowers, as mentioned, 
play an integral part in federal regulation and enforcement under the 
FCA.  However, by allowing them to recover up to 30 percent of fines 
incurred by the pharmaceutical companies, it is plausible that some 
people in a position to blow the whistle might attempt to game the 
system.  For example, David Franklin, a former employee of Parke-
Davis (later purchased by Pfizer), acted as a whistleblower when he sued 
on behalf of taxpayers to recover money the government paid for drugs 
illegally promoted off-label.
51
  The problematic aspect of this narrative is 
 
 46. Craft, supra note 1, at 113. 
 47. Id. at 113; see also Evans, supra note 23 (shedding light on how a former Pfizer 
employee was instrumental in bringing the illegality of the company’s off-label 
promotion to the government’s attention and mentioning how the employee collected 
$24.6 million under the FCA for blowing the whistle on his former employer). 
 48. Evans, supra note 23. 
 49. Osborn, supra note 21, at 310. 
 50. Id.; see also United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 
51-52 (D. Mass. 2001) (ruling that, in general, a violation of the FDCA for off-label 
promotion is sufficient to establish liability under the FCA, regardless of whether the 
underlying promotional statements were false or medically inaccurate). 
 51. Evans, supra note 23. 
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that Franklin holds a Ph.D. in microbiology from the University of 
Rhode Island, and, before taking a job with Parke-Davis, he was a 
pediatric researcher at Harvard University’s Dana-Farber Cancer 
Institute.
52
  Franklin is also married to a lawyer.
53
  Given his background 
in science and medicine, and his spouse’s legal acumen, one can question 
why he agreed to perform tasks that a priori he should have reasonably 
known were illegal.  Thus, it is quite plausible that similarly situated and 
informed corporate insiders are motivated to further illegal promotion 
schemes, rather than resist them, given the potential to recover millions 
of dollars—even if they are essentially blowing the whistle on their own 
actions. 
E. Liability under the FCA Pursuant to the Anti-Kickback Statute 
One additional theory of liability under the FCA involves claims 
made pursuant to the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), which “prohibits 
payments in any form, direct or indirect, made purposefully to induce or 
reward the referral or generation of federal health care business.”54  No 
private right of action exists under the AKS, which is why the FCA has 
served as the necessary vehicle for whistleblowers to bring fraud claims 
for AKS violations.
55
  Allowing whistleblower actions via the FCA for 
violations of the AKS is an integral part of federal regulation because it 
helps reduce two violations at once: (1) it helps cut down on the 
propensity of inducements and rewards being paid to doctors for referrals 
involving federal health care business, while (2) alerting the proper 
authorities of illegal off-label promotions. 
F. The Washington Legal Foundation Cases and FDAMA 
Although several mechanisms exist for the FDA to regulate off-
label promotion and marketing, their power to do so was constitutionally 
limited by the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) cases in the 1990s.
56
  
The WLF challenged the FDA’s restrictions on distribution of off-label 
information by manufacturers on First Amendment freedom of speech 
grounds.
57
  The WLF decisions allow manufacturers to disseminate 
scientific publications concerning the off-label use of their products to 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Craft, supra note 1, at 113; see also Stephanie Greene, False Claims Act 
Liability for Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceutical Products, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 41, 
56 (2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2000)). 
 55. Greene, supra note 54, at 56-57. 
 56. Osborn, supra note 21, at 311. 
 57. Ascroft, supra note 30, at 103. 
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physicians or other medical professionals, regardless of whether such 
articles include a significant or exclusive focus on uses of drugs or 
medical devices other than those approved by the FDA.
58
  Moreover, 
manufacturers can have open involvement with continuing medical 
education (CME) seminars that discuss off-label uses by providing 
financial support and by suggesting the content or the speakers for the 
event.
59
 
In response to the WLF cases, Congress passed the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) in 1997.  Before the 
passage of the FDAMA, the FDA strongly opposed the dissemination of 
off-label information of any kind by a drug manufacturer.
60
  Section 401 
of FDAMA included the first provision to allow pharmaceutical 
companies to disseminate off-label information under certain 
circumstances.
61
 
FDAMA allowed drug companies to disseminate off-label 
information only to health care practitioners, pharmacy benefit managers, 
health insurance issuers, group health plans, and governmental 
agencies.
62
  Manufacturers were only allowed to circulate authorized 
information contained in either unabridged peer-review journals or 
certain qualified reference publications.
63
  If manufacturers decided to 
disseminate off-label information, they were required to prominently 
affix alongside the information a disclaimer alerting readers that, if 
applicable, other drugs were approved for this use and that the 
information contains a drug or device that is not FDA approved.
64
  
Notably, pharmaceutical companies could only disseminate such 
information if they were actively seeking approval by the FDA for the 
new use by means of a supplemental new drug application (sNDA) or if 
such approval would be cost-prohibitive or unethical.
65
  Thus, while 
FDAMA opened the door slightly to drug manufacturers, it placed 
 
 58. See id. at 104-05; see also Green, supra note 54, at 52. 
 59. Green, supra note 54, at 52-53. 
 60. Ascroft, supra note 30, at 101. 
 61. Id. at 102. 
 62. Id.; see also Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 
111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 
U.S.C.). 
 63. Ascroft, supra note 30, at 102. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.; see also Tim Mackey & Bryan A. Liang, Off-Label Promotion Reform: A 
Legislative Proposal Addressing Vulnerable Patient Drug Access and Limiting 
Inappropriate Pharmaceutical Marketing, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1, 8 (2011) 
(discussing how the court upheld FDAMA’s sNDA requirement in the second WLF case, 
quantifying it as a safe harbor provision that did not prohibit protected speech or certain 
conduct “but merely ensured manufacturers that enforcement action[s] would not be 
taken if they conformed [with] certain requirements”). 
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significant limitations on the exchange of off-label information and 
allowed the FDA substantial room to regulate and investigate possible 
violations. 
FDAMA attempted to provide clarity in FDA regulation and 
enforcement of off-label marketing.  The regulatory waters were 
muddied, however, by the WLF cases, and this ambiguity was 
exacerbated by FDAMA’s expiration on September 30, 2006.66  The 
current state of flux provides even more reason for simplified, 
enforceable legislation in this arena. 
G. Ghostwriting: A Form of False-Advertising? 
The WLF decisions effectively permit some marketing of drugs for 
unapproved uses without the risk and expense of the trials required for 
FDA approval.
67
  Drug companies subsequently took advantage of this 
opening by practicing the scientifically and ethically troubling practice of 
“ghostwriting.”68  Ghostwriting is the process by which a pharmaceutical 
company contracts with or hires a medical education and 
communications company (MECC) to draft articles about new uses for 
FDA-approved drugs or medical devices.
69
  The company itself or the 
MECC it contracts with will then work with prominent physicians and 
scientists and pay the academic to sign his or her name as the author to 
increase the likelihood that the article will be published in important 
medical journals.
70
  Thus, when the article appears in the press, the 
doctor appears as the author, while the contributions of the ghostwriter 
and the pharmaceutical company remain hidden.
71
 
Medical literature on off-label medicine can have benefits because it 
makes physicians, especially in rural areas, aware of contemporary 
medical techniques and newfound uses for previously approved drugs.  
However, these benefits only occur if the information is accurate.  The 
concern about ghostwriting “is that doctors might change their 
prescribing habits after reading certain articles, unaware they were 
commissioned by a drug company.”72  Ghostwritten articles always 
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contain undisclosed conflicts of interests, making it impossible for a 
doctor to know whether an article is legitimate.
73
  Given their financial 
incentives, it is not surprising that “a ghostwriter of original research will 
package the message of the research paper so that it fits into the 
marketing plan for the drug.”74  Thus, surreptitiously affixing the names 
of well-regarded scientists and doctors to these articles enhances the 
legitimacy of these articles’ favorable conclusions.75 
Exemplifying the potential harm caused by ghostwriting is Wyeth’s 
(a pharmaceutical company later acquired by Pfizer) push for two of its 
hormone drugs to be used to protect against aging skin, heart disease, and 
dementia.
76
  Ghostwritten articles emphasizing the benefits of the two 
hormones were published in medical journals from 1998 to 2005.
77
  
However, in 2002, a federal study on hormone therapy demonstrated that 
menopausal women taking certain hormones had an increased risk of 
invasive breast cancer, heart disease, and stroke.
78
 
Heads of these MECCs vow that the companies “will not participate 
in the publication of any material in which it does not have complete 
confidence in the scientific validity of the content, based upon the best 
available data.”79  Nevertheless, this example shows explicitly how 
medical research can take swift and dangerous turns, and further why 
participating in the required FDA testing is so important to ensure public 
safety. 
Lurking within many of these ghostwritten articles is a Faustian 
bargain.  Pharmaceutical companies directly pay MECCs to draft articles 
that include research—whether or not substantiated—supporting the 
drug’s use for off-label purposes.  In the worst-case scenario, the 
academics that sign off on the draft as being scientifically accurate do not 
even perform research or review the adequacy of findings.  They are 
merely selling their established credibility and putative integrity for 
monetary gain.  Thus, these articles are not only biased in favor of the 
drug manufacturers, but their existence can undermine faith in actual 
high-quality studies because, intrinsically, there is no transparency in 
these arrangements.   
When questioned about the credibility of their findings, 
pharmaceutical companies will often deny their affiliated academics the 
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opportunity to review raw data.
80
  This situation occurred with Proctor & 
Gamble (P&G) and Aubrey Blumsohn, a senior lecturer in the Bone 
Metabolism Unit at Sheffield University.
81
  In 2002, Blumsohn 
contracted with P&G to perform research and speak on the company’s 
behalf about new uses for drugs.
82
  However, when Blumsohn finally 
became convinced that P&G had intentionally skewed their data to make 
it look as if a drug was performing better than it really had, P&G refused 
to share the raw data with him.
83
  This instance reveals that the research-
driven data that pharma gives to MECCs and academics might not only 
be selectively cherry-picked, but could also be falsified. 
The prevalence of ghostwriting exacerbates the problem.  One study 
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) 
concluded that ghostwriting was evident in 11 percent of published 
articles appearing in six leading medical journals.
84
  More specifically, a 
study solely focusing on medical literature devoted to the Pfizer’s drug, 
Zoloft, found that, in three years, approximately 57 percent (55 of 96) of 
all published articles on the drug in peer-reviewed medical journals were 
written by a MECC that Pfizer hired to manage publications on Zoloft.
85
 
Due to this lack of transparency, inherent conflict of interest, 
problems with credibility and falsification, and its ubiquity, the practice 
of ghostwriting is a fraud on journals, their readers, and patients.  Pharma 
has mastered the secrecy of the process and has repeatedly breached 
respected medical journals’ safeguards to publish these ghostwritten 
articles.  Readers, very often doctors, are thus deceived into believing 
flawed or falsified studies as credible basis for medical decision-making.  
In turn, ghostwriting affects patients because doctors put these 
unsubstantiated treatments into practice, which can be either unbeneficial 
or possibly dangerous to the patient.   
H. Unethical and Aggressive Courting of Physicians 
Ghostwritten articles are simply one component of an integrated 
strategy to promote off-label usage.  Pharma’s multi-pronged approach 
includes the following tactics: (1) instructing sales representatives to 
initiate discussions with doctors during sales calls regarding off-label 
uses; (2) using medical liaisons working in conjunction with sales 
representatives when the medical community believes the liaisons are 
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individuals hired to provide scientific knowledge rather than sell a 
manufacturer’s drug; (3) paying doctors to allow its sales representatives 
to participate in discussions with patients regarding treatment options; 
(4) paying doctors to travel to lavish locations to attend consultant or 
advisory meetings that exclusively discuss off-label uses of the 
company’s drugs; (5) hosting teleconferences where the company pays 
doctors to instruct other doctors about newly discovered off-label uses; 
and (6) hosting CME seminars that are intended to give the appearance 
of providing independent medical education regarding off-label uses.
86
 
These tactics represent potentially multiple AKS violations.  
Further, although the WLF decisions decided that hosting CME seminars 
are within a manufacturer’s rights, the above practices are clearly aimed 
to increase the market for their drugs in an ethically questionable 
manner.  Given drug manufacturers’ aggressive tactics to expand the 
market for their drugs without applying for supplemental FDA-approval, 
it is obvious why the FDA and DOJ are adamant about investigating 
these companies for illegally circumventing the system.  As former 
Associate Attorney General Robert McCallum highlighted, the stakes are 
the following: 
It is of paramount importance that the DOJ use every legal tool at its 
disposal to assure the health and safety of the consumer of America’s 
health care system, and to pursue companies and individuals that 
steal from the taxpayers and inflict suffering on patients and 
families.
87
 
I. Gag Clauses and Data Transparency 
Gag clauses are a means for pharmaceutical companies, as sponsors 
of clinical research with a financial interest in the outcome, to suppress 
negative test results.  As Robert Steinbrook notes, gag clauses frequently 
appear in clinical-trial agreements and serve to “prevent investigators 
from examining the data independently” or from publishing the results 
“without first obtaining the consent of the sponsor.”88  Negative results 
are thus routinely underreported or unreported altogether. 
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Pharma’s control over the clinical-trial process results in a lack of 
transparency and, consequently, an unsafe environment for American 
consumers.  Pharma retains this control due to the monetary support they 
provide academic institutions, unaffiliated medical centers, and private 
contract research organizations (CROs).  As a result, these research 
bodies are forced to compete with each other over pharma-sponsored 
clinical-trial agreements.  One could argue that academic institutions 
have reputational interests and institutional values that can countervail 
this pressure to accept gag clauses.  However, for-profit CROs do not 
have these same constraints.  In fact, over the last decade, CROs have 
dramatically increased their share of the clinical research at the expense 
of academic institutions because of their malleability to pharma’s 
needs.
89
  Thus, this race to the bottom in the clinical testing marketplace 
enables pharma to insist on gag clauses in research contracts.  
Over a decade ago, the International Committee of Medical Journal 
Editors (ICMJE) “began to require that the responsible author of a study 
state in writing that he or she accepted full responsibility for the conduct 
of the trial, had access to the data, and controlled the decision to 
publish.”90  However, the ICMJE only represents a handful of medical 
journals and is not in a position to establish industry-wide guidelines.  
Such lack of influence is demonstrated by a Duke University study, 
which revealed that academic institutions routinely engaged in industry-
sponsored research that failed to adhere to ICMJE guidelines.
91
  
Although several researchers and regulatory bodies propose the need for 
standard contract provisions for industry-sponsored research, such 
provisions are frequently absent from clinical-trial agreements because of 
the ongoing competition for research sponsorship. 
The argument against gag clauses continues to gain traction since 
the avoidable Vioxx fiasco and the trial-related disclosure of internal 
emails of pharmaceutical giant Merck.  These documents demonstrate 
that Merck knew years before it pulled Vioxx off the shelves that the 
drug had increased risks of heart disease and stroke as compared to its 
industry competitors: aspirin and naproxen.
92
  Although Vioxx was not 
 
 89. Fazal Khan, The Human Factor: Globalizing Ethical Standards in Drug Trials 
Through Market Exclusion, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 894 (2007) (Observing that, “as the 
size of the drug market dramatically expanded . . . pharmaceutical companies became 
impatient with academic centers, and by the late 1990s the monetary flow from drug 
companies to academic centers had greatly receded.”). 
 90. See Steinbrook, supra note 88, at 2160. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Anna Wilde Mathews & Barbara Martinez, Warning Signs: E-Mails Suggest 
Merck Knew Vioxx’s Dangers at Early Stage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2004, at A1; Dani 
Veracity, Leaked Documents Show Merck Knew of Vioxx Dangers, Yet Hid Them for 
Years, NATURALNEWS.COM (Aug. 6, 2005), http://bit.ly/TxNoPN; E. Huff, Merck Sat on 
  
2012] VERIFY, THEN TRUST 423 
taken off the market until September 2004, reports indicate that Merck 
knew of the life-threatening side effects as early as 1996.
93
  Merck 
conducted tests during which they intentionally excluded participants 
with an increased risk of heart disease because they did not want to risk 
the chance of profuse negative results.
94
 
The company’s research directors also explained the profound 
negative side effects of Vioxx to Merck’s executive management.  In 
March 2000, Merck’s research chief, Edward Scolnick, wrote in an email 
his belief that test results unmistakably affirmed that heart problems 
associated with Vioxx were “clearly there” and that it was a “shame.”95  
Merck’s indiscretions affecting public safety went even further, as they 
consistently threatened and sued academic researchers who questioned 
the safety of Vioxx during public lectures.
96
  These actions demonstrate 
that not only is pharma willing to cease sponsoring academic institutions 
who insist on publishing the truth, but companies are willing to risk the 
health of the nation as they intentionally mislead American doctors and 
patients about the safety of their products. 
Progress against gag clauses may be forthcoming as concern mounts 
about public safety, distrust of the pharmaceutical industry spreads, and 
advocacy within the medical community for greater openness in 
conducting and reporting clinical trials increases.
97
  Senators Chris Dodd 
and Chuck Grassley confronted this challenge head on and attempted to 
pass legislation including the Fair Access to Clinical Trials (FACT) Act 
of 2007 and the Food and Drug Administration Safety Act of 2007 
(FDASA).
98
 
The FACT Act sought to amend the Public Health Service Act and 
was premised on increased transparency of the entire industry and greater 
accountability in health research and development.
99
  It sought to ensure 
that both the scientific community and the public have access to basic 
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information about clinical trials by expanding data that is already made 
available at clinicaltrials.gov.
100
  The main objective of the FACT Act 
was to operate a data bank of information on clinical trials, to include 
(1) a clinical trials registry of health-related interventions conducted 
to test the safety or effectiveness of any drug, biological product, or 
device intended to treat serious or life-threatening diseases and 
condition; and (2) a clinical trial results database of health-related 
interventions to test the safety or effectiveness of any drug, biological 
product, or device.
101
 
Whereas the FACT Act’s focus was primarily on public access to 
the clinical trial process, FDASA sought to enhance the drug-safety 
monitoring system.  Its goal was to bring a new level of priority and 
independence to the post-market surveillance of drugs by establishing an 
independent center within the FDA responsible for monitoring the safety 
of drugs once they are on the market.
102
  This center would have the 
authority to take corrective action if a drug is a risk to patients.
103
  In 
essence, the FACT Act would have armed the FDA with a greater ability 
to regulate pharma and would have provided reliable assurance that the 
drugs on the market are in fact safe for consumers. 
Although these acts provided a means of superior regulation in both 
pre- and post-market drug surveillance, neither act was passed into law.  
Nonetheless, there are several constructive takeaways from the ideas of 
Senators Dodd and Grassley.  American consumers need structural 
accountability from pharma-sponsored testing that consistently 
underreports negative results, paints unsupportive results in a brighter 
light, and publishes almost every positive test.
104
  Although there are 
notable benefits to companies not going through the lengthy and cost-
prohibitive constraints of the regulatory process, it is imperative for 
consumer safety and fiscal responsibility (i.e., by prohibiting fraud 
against the government) that research results are founded upon reliable 
data. 
The FACT Act and FDASA were dedicated to affording greater 
transparency of clinical trials, providing greater accountability of 
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pharma, and offering objective, post-market surveillance of 
pharmaceuticals.  In the Obama administration’s recent FDA budget 
request for 2013, it sought a significant increase in industry-paid user 
fees.  To reduce the effect of gag clauses on clinical-trial reporting, user 
fees could sponsor an independent center to perform equivalent clinical 
testing.  This independent center, with no financial incentive to 
promulgate unsubstantiated results or conceal negative tests, could be 
relied on to bring forth the actual results of clinical trials.  The 
independent center would be responsible for publishing the trial results in 
a database such as clinicaltrials.gov, thus inserting this information into 
the public domain.  If the pharma-sponsored clinical trials were in line 
with the independent testing, then pharma could publish the results.  This 
alternative would ensure that the drug industry was not merely 
publishing favorable results and skewing public knowledge. 
Another alternative, which could supplement the suggestion above, 
would be to create a user-fee-sponsored independent testing center that 
conducts post-market testing on drugs deriving a significant portion of 
their profit from off-label uses.  As the struggle against ghostwriting 
persists, off-label uses continue to gain prevalence, and pharma 
continuously avoids accountability.  Independent post-market testing of 
drugs prominently prescribed for non-FDA approved off-label uses 
would bring certainty and clarity to the efficacy of such off-label uses.  
Doctors’ access to actual results would be greater, providing for surety 
and safety in prescribing practices.  The FDA approval process is time-
consuming and costly, and there is acknowledged benefits to bypassing 
this process at times.  However, such benefits should never outweigh 
concerns for public safety.  Although additional changes to the entire 
process should be considered, the authors hope that these two ideas 
provide at least a well-conceived starting point for greater discussion. 
III. WHAT WE GAIN AND LOSE FROM OFF-LABEL REGULATIONS 
The fight between proponents and opponents of off-label marketing 
is endless, and combines a mixture of both theoretical and practical costs 
and benefits.  The primary benefit of off-label promotion is to keep the 
health care community informed about scientific advances that will 
benefit patients.
105
  This information will in turn improve the quality of 
health care without waiting for the lengthy FDA approval process.
106
  On 
the other hand, there is a strong temptation for manufacturers to promote 
off-label use of their drugs purely for profit, without concern for public 
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health.
107
  Profit-driven off-label promotion can expose the public to 
severe health risks and the drug manufacturer to legal liability.
108
 
A. Proponents’ Arguments in Support of Off-Label Promotion 
As mentioned, the arguments for and against off-label marketing 
range from the practical to the theoretical.  Proponents argue that off-
label medicine is necessary to ensure that patients receive the most 
effective treatment.
109
  Underlying this argument, proponents theorize 
that drug companies are in the best position to provide doctors with 
current medical research and treatments, given the vast amount of 
medical literature and the lack of time doctors have to read it.
110
  
Building on this idea is the fact that the FDA approval and review 
process lags behind the availability of the most innovative approaches 
and therapies, validating that pharmaceutical companies and their sales 
reps are in the best position to make doctors aware of cutting-edge 
technologies and practices.
111
  Provided that doctors are experts in this 
field, proponents further argue that they are “best able to evaluate the 
information and [i]nsure that patients receive appropriate treatment[s]”—
an argument supported by the American “learned intermediary” tort 
doctrine.
112
 
The strongest and most readily identified supporting argument for 
off-label marketing is its cost-containment potential.  Avoiding the 
lengthy and extensive FDA approval process can decrease costs “both in 
terms of controlling price increases and in saving tax dollars channeled 
to FDA efforts.”113  By allowing off-label uses, drug companies should 
experience increased sales volume allowing them to decrease sales 
price.
114
  Allowing manufacturers to sell their products off-label will also 
save them the time, money, and resources that they otherwise would 
expend to become FDA approved.
115
 
However, this cost-cutting theory holds little weight when the actual 
numbers are analyzed.  Between 1990 and 1999—the prime decade of 
expansion for off-label marketing efforts—Medicaid spending on 
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prescription drugs more than tripled from $4.8 billion to $17 billion.
116
  
In fact, between 1990 and 2002, the total amount spent in the U.S. on 
prescription drugs increased from $40.6 billion to $162 billion.
117
  
During that same time, prescription drug prices increased 7.4 percent, 
compared to inflation rising merely 2.5 percent.
118
  On that same note, 
prices for the 200 top-selling drugs are currently rising three times faster 
than the country’s inflation rate.119  As Margaret Johns highlights, “[T]he 
price of Claritin, the top-selling allergy pill, was raised thirteen times 
over five years, an increase of more than 50%—more than four times the 
rate of inflation.”120  Given this data, projections estimate that national 
spending on prescription drugs will increase an average of 10.7 percent 
until 2013.
121
  Thus, although the argument that off-label promotion will 
drive cost-cutting is theoretically tenable, the statistics indicate 
otherwise. 
Authors Mackey and Liang present a novel approach to the 
regulation of off-label medicine based on relaxed regulatory standards 
for drugs intended for vulnerable patient and orphan disease patient 
populations.
122
  As discussed in Part IV infra, there are merits to this 
proposal when considering the costs of regulatory approval—even under 
the Orphan Drug Act of 1983—and the expected financial incentives.  
These authors argue that, since the vulnerable patient and orphan disease 
patient populations have relatively few, if any, options for recovery by 
FDA approved drugs and are already at risk of death, the FDA’s 
regulatory protections based on ensuring safety and efficacy are not as 
relevant.
123
  However, the D.C. Circuit ruled that vulnerable patient 
populations, like healthy populations, have no fundamental right of 
access to experimental drugs that have not gone through the FDA 
approval process.
124
  Citing the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. 
Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555-56 (1979), the court in Abigail Alliance 
noted “that ‘[f]or the terminally ill, as for anyone else, a drug is unsafe if 
its potential for inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by the 
possibility of therapeutic benefit.’”125  In the court’s view, because a drug 
cannot be proven either safe or effective for a certain use without going 
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through all phases of FDA approval, its potential for inflicting death or 
injury is not offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefit.  Therefore, 
unapproved drugs are categorically deemed unsafe. 
The authors’ proposal, however, can be distinguished from the 
plaintiffs in Abigail Alliance because it focuses on off-label uses of drugs 
that have already been approved, not drugs that have yet to receive any 
FDA approval.  Yet, one can read from the main holding in Abigail 
Alliance an argument against relaxing prohibitions on off-label 
marketing in the absence of proven therapeutic benefits for off-label 
uses.
126
 
B. Opponents’ Arguments against Off-Label Promotion 
The aforementioned benefits and overarching (albeit 
unsubstantiated) financial cost argument must also be “balanced with the 
FDA’s underlying mission to ensure the safety and efficacy of 
products.”127  The major concern stems from the possibility that 
manufacturers who are purely concerned with their bottom-line—
whether trying to maximize profits before patents expire or searching to 
expand the market for an approved drug—will “seek to market a product 
for a new use by bypassing the formal FDA approval process and its 
costs.”128  If off-label promotion is allowed, opponents argue that drug 
companies will have no incentive to conduct the rigorous testing the 
FDA requires and will completely avoid responsibility for establishing 
that a drug is safe and effective for the off-label use they are 
promoting.
129
  Opponents corroborate this argument with several 
examples of off-label drug uses gone horribly wrong (notably, Vioxx, 
Fen-phen, and Neurontin), to demonstrate that drug company research 
conducted outside of the FDA oversight process is suspect given the 
inherent conflicts of interest.
130
  Opponents further posit that, because of 
the onslaught of ghostwritten academic articles in distribution, “the 
doctor’s role as a learned intermediary has been severely 
compromised.”131 
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C. Why Pharmaceutical Companies Continue to Promote Off-Label 
It is understandable why pharma plays the double-game of denying 
that they illegally promote particular off-label usages while asserting in 
general that off-label usage is good for the public.  Off-label marketing 
affords drug manufacturers increased market growth and obvious cost-
cutting and profit-increasing possibilities from circumventing the FDA 
approval process.  In contrast, “Rigorous clinical trials of new uses of 
previously approved products are not only costly, but can also be 
extremely risky for a firm that has a lucrative product on the market.”132 
Obtaining FDA approval for a drug is a monetarily exhausting and 
time-consuming process.  The “approval process takes six to fifteen 
years and costs between $100 million and $880 million per drug.”133  The 
approval process demands the successful navigation of three increasingly 
larger sets of human clinical trials, known as Phases I through III.
134
  
Following the conclusion of Phase III, the manufacturer must submit a 
NDA to the FDA, which is supposed to report on all phases of testing.
135
 
After all three phases of research is complete and the FDA approves 
the NDA, the manufacturer may, on its own volition, conduct additional 
Phase IV research.
136
  Phase IV research may or may not be subject to 
the same restrictions and informed consent requirements that 
manufacturers face during Phase I-III research, depending on the purpose 
underlying the Phase IV research.
137
  Most drug companies that choose to 
conduct Phase IV research opt to study side effects that possibly went 
undetected in the initial trials, which is the route that does not face 
stringent FDA restrictions.
138
 
A study on the effects of hormone replacement therapy (HRT) on 
the risk of heart disease in post-menopausal women is a prime example 
of the risk that rigorous clinical trials pose to a drug manufacturer that is 
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already enjoying substantial off-label sales.
139
  HRT, previously 
approved for relief of menopausal symptoms, was at the time also being 
prescribed regularly to lower the risk of heart disease for these women.
140
  
Although HRT manufacturers were formally banned from promoting 
HRT for this off-label purpose, they were reaping the benefits of 
significantly increased sales from prescriptions in reliance on the results 
of prior observational studies (which ultimately ended up being 
discredited).
141
  Thus, HRT manufacturers had little economic reason to 
subject the use of HRTs to more rigorous testing. 
HRT manufacturers’ windfall profits abruptly ended when the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) conducted a long-term, controlled 
study with over 16,000 patients.
142
  The NIH results “indicated an 
increased risk of heart disease (as well as increased risks of other 
diseases) in women receiving HRT.”143  Not surprisingly, this study 
decimated sales of the hormone treatment.
144
  Industry’s prior position 
that this study was unnecessary is indefensible as, “[i]n this case, 
government funding provided valuable and credible information that the 
product’s manufacturer had little incentive to uncover on its own[,]” and 
the information resulting from it is of undeniable value to patients, 
physicians, health insurers, and policy makers.
145
 
IV. MITIGATING THE HARMS AND REAPING THE BENEFITS:  ALLOWING 
A SAFE HARBOR TO PROMOTE OFF-LABEL RESEARCH CONDUCTED 
UNDER THE PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
As discussed above, current off-label marketing restrictions are 
subject to several powerful criticisms: (1) they restrict flow of 
information that could help both doctors and patients; (2) the rules are 
inefficient and lead to companies willfully breaching the law; and 
(3) such rules may violate the First Amendment rights of pharmaceutical 
companies. 
All of the above critiques have persuasive force only if we have 
confidence that industry communications regarding specific off-label 
usages are indeed accurate.  However, as previously mentioned, there is 
ample evidence that pharma has corrupted the practice of off-label 
 
 139. Id. at 989; see also J.E. Rossouw et al., Risks and Benefits of Estrogen Plus 
Progestin in Healthy Postmenopausal Women: Principal Results from the Women’s 
Health Initiative Randomized Controlled Trial, 288 JAMA 321 (2002). 
 140. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 732. 
 141. Id. 
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 143. Id. 
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 145. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 732. 
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prescribing.  Its contemporary form is far removed from its origins as a 
way of preserving physician autonomy in practicing the “art of 
medicine” and allowing for innovation.  Instead, it has become a 
backdoor for pharma to generate substantial profits on patented drugs by 
creating new markets without proving to the public that such uses are 
safe and effective.  Further, there is ample evidence that many of the off-
label studies sponsored by pharma are not trustworthy and are the fruit of 
questionable practices such as gag clauses, cherry-picked data, and 
ghostwriting.  Consequently, patients and third party payors likely incur 
harms because medically unproven therapies raise issues of both patient 
safety and unnecessary healthcare expenses. 
This begs the question of what would happen if the off-label 
research being disseminated by drug companies was actually reliable and 
produced by independent researchers using sound methodology?  Should 
evidence of these research characteristics significantly change FDA rules 
on restricting off-label marketing?  In this section, we argue in the 
affirmative: that is, in the presence of research criteria that can be 
validated as trustworthy, the FDA should allow for wider and less 
restricted dissemination of off-label study findings. 
This section proposes (1) to amend the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and the role of the Patient Centered 
Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) to increase the amount of 
trustworthy comparative effectiveness research (CER) on off-label drug 
uses, and (2) to amend FDA regulations to create a “safe harbor” for off-
label marketing of CER studies generated through this process.  The 
rationale behind this proposal is that promoting off-label uses to 
physicians is not intrinsically harmful and, in fact, could be beneficial if 
there is some way to ensure the validity of the disseminated speech.  
Recognizing that the incentives for conducting CER on off-label uses can 
vary greatly depending on particular circumstances, the proposal sets 
forth two different research tracks: one track to be initiated and funded 
by PCORI; and a second track to be initiated and funded by 
pharmaceutical companies, but that is overseen by PCORI. 
A. What is Comparative Effectiveness Research? 
Using evidence based medicine (EBM) and comparative 
effectiveness research (CER) to guide treatment decisions is not a novel 
concept.  In the 1970s, for example, the founder of the Dartmouth Atlas 
Project, Dr. Jack Wennberg, analyzed Medicare utilization data and 
uncovered dramatic geographic variation in the utilization of healthcare 
resources.  Wennberg identified an epidemic of hysterectomies in some 
areas of Maine, where the data predicted that 70 percent of the women in 
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one town would receive this procedure sometime during their lifetime.
146
  
Medical need was not driving this epidemic, but rather local medical 
practice and fee-for-service economic incentives. 
In the 1980s, the predecessor of the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS), the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA), “launched an aggressive program of research on outcomes of 
care that would serve as the basis of medical practice guidelines and even 
coverage policy for federal health insurance programs.”147  However, 
HCFA and CMS have always faced political pushback from 
manufacturers of costly medical devices and other health care 
stakeholders who were rightly concerned that robust CER data could 
undermine profits stemming from expensive care with little or no 
demonstrable benefits. 
In 1999, the Health Care Research and Quality Act established the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) to generate a 
“broad base of scientific research” to assess the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of health care services and improve outcomes.
148
  As 
before, political considerations moved Congress to specify that the 
AHRQ could not “mandate national standards of clinical practice”;149 in 
other words, its recommendations could not directly guide coverage 
decisions. 
More recently, in an influential article published in The New Yorker, 
medical author Atul Gawande used Dartmouth Atlas data to highlight 
“why two border towns in Texas of similar size, location, and 
circumstances—McAllen and El Paso—should cost Medicare such 
enormously different amounts of money.”150  Costs in McAllen were 
twice as much as in El Paso due to physicians ordering “vastly more 
diagnostic tests, hospital admissions, operations, specialist visits, and 
home nursing care.”151  Further, Gawande concluded that the quality of 
care in McAllen “is not appreciably better, and by some measures, it is 
worse.”152  In other words, without credible evidence of safety and 
efficacy, more healthcare—whether in the form of off-label prescriptions 
or diagnostic tests—can be costly and dangerous. 
 
 146. Alix Spiegel, The Telltale Wombs of Lewiston, Maine, NPR (Oct. 9, 2008), 
http://n.pr/6FPAm. 
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 148. Id. at 531. 
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 150. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum Redux, THE NEW YORKER (June 23, 2009), 
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In 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 
directed the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to develop a report that defined 
CER and its importance in setting research priorities:
153
 
CER is the generation and synthesis of evidence that compares the 
benefits and harms of alternative methods to prevent, diagnose, treat, 
and monitor a clinical condition or to improve the delivery of care.  
The purpose of CER is to assist consumers, clinicians, purchasers, 
and policy makers to make informed decisions that will improve 
health care at both the individual and population levels.
154
 
Notably, ARRA set aside $1.1 billion to fund CER through several 
federal agencies: the AHRQ, the NIH, and the Office of the Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).
155
  All of these 
efforts informed the creation of PCORI, which has the potential to 
incorporate more broadly CER and evidence based medicine (EBM) into 
the structure of healthcare in the U.S. and bring it more in line with the 
healthcare systems of other developed nations. 
B. What is the Patient Centered Outcomes Research Institute? 
As stated on its website: “PCORI was established by Congress 
through the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act but is by 
law an independent, non-profit organization.”156  A 21-member board 
governs PCORI, and it actively seeks “input from a broad range of 
stakeholders to guide its work.”  In January 2012, PCORI released its 
“Draft National Priorities for Research and Research Agenda” and 
opened it up to comments from the public.
157
  PPACA defines the role of 
PCORI as the following: 
The purpose of the Institute is to assist patients, clinicians, 
purchasers, and policy-makers in making informed health decisions 
by advancing the quality and relevance of evidence concerning the 
manner in which diseases, disorders, and other health conditions can 
effectively and appropriately be prevented, diagnosed, treated, 
 
 153. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 804, 
123 Stat. 115, 187-88 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-8 (2006 & Supp. 2010)). 
 154. COMM. ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH PRIORITIZATION, INST. OF 
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EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 13 (2009). 
 155. Comparative Effectiveness Research Funding, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., http://1.usa.gov/y1UCU (last visited Oct. 23, 2012). 
 156. About Us, PCORI, http://bit.ly/piYn0m (last visited Oct. 23, 2012). 
 157. PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH INST., DRAFT NATIONAL PRIORITIES 
FOR RESEARCH AND RESEARCH AGENDA VERSION 1 (2012), available at 
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monitored, and managed through research and evidence synthesis 
that considers variations in patient subpopulations, and the 
dissemination of research findings with respect to the relative health 
outcomes, clinical effectiveness, and appropriateness of the medical 
treatments, services. . . .
158
 
To address concerns from pharma and medical device manufacturers 
(and affiliated politicians) that CER might be used to “ration” healthcare 
or, more hyperbolically, to establish “death panels,” PPACA expressly 
limits PCORI findings from being used “to mandate coverage, 
reimbursement, or other policies for any public or private payer.”159  
Nevertheless, nothing in PPACA prevents Medicare or private payors 
from being influenced by PCORI findings in determining what is 
“medically necessary” and hence subject to coverage. 
PPACA created the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust 
Fund (PCORTF) to generate funding and provide oversight of PCORI 
spending.
160
  PCORTF is funded by a transfer of funds from Medicare 
Part A and B and fees levied on private insurers and self-insured 
employer health plans.
161
  Given that funding studies on certain drugs 
could be seen as picking winners and losers, PCORI did not identify 
specific research projects but instead five general areas of research it 
considers as top priorities: preventative care, healthcare systems, 
communication and dissemination, healthcare disparities, and research 
methodologies.
162
  Going forward, these broad categories will likely be 
fleshed out with more detailed descriptions of specific research projects, 
“taking into account factors of disease incidence, prevalence, and burden 
in the U.S. (with emphasis on chronic conditions)” and “gaps in evidence 
in terms of clinical outcomes.”163 
Is there reason to trust the legitimacy of PCORI findings more than 
studies currently being conducted under the direction of industry?  
PCORI states that research commissioned by it “will produce 
information patients and their health care providers can trust.”164  PCORI 
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can credibly make this claim because the statutory language that created 
it has robust requirements for ensuring (1) transparency of research 
results, (2) conflict of interest disclosures, and (3) best practices in 
research methodologies.  For instance, all PCORI research data will be 
publicly available, negating legitimacy issues tied to industry practices of 
gag clauses, manipulating or suppressing data.  Conflict of interest rules 
can prevent issues associated with “ghostwriting” or researchers being 
financially dependent on funding from pharmaceutical companies, which 
might influence their findings if they want follow-up research contracts.  
Methodological oversight is important as “[m]any medical professionals 
maintain that findings from current clinical trials used to test the safety 
and efficacy of pharmaceutical products and medical devices do not 
reflect the conditions of medical practice and thus their findings are less 
relevant to medical practitioners.”165 
C. Where Does Off-Label Research Fit Within PCORI’s Mission? 
Given the prevalence of off-label usage for many chronic conditions 
and the gaps in knowledge regarding the safety and effectiveness of these 
uses, it seems that a broad class of off-label research fits within PCORI’s 
mission.  As described above, in general the pharmaceutical and medical 
device industries are extremely wary of CER because it can conclusively 
demonstrate that many expensive and profitable products are no more 
effective than less costly alternatives.  In this situation, there is a strong 
public interest in PCORI conducting CER on these off-label uses, 
especially since pharmaceutical companies have a strong financial 
incentive in avoiding such comparisons if they cannot control the data or 
are uncertain that the research will be in their favor.  However, there 
might be some instances where a drug company might want research 
validation of a promising off-label use, but the potential market is too 
small (i.e., an “orphan disease”) to justify a full-blown sNDA.  
Additionally, since insurers often reject coverage of such off-label use on 
grounds that it is “experimental,” validation by PCORI testing could 
open the door for third-party reimbursement.  Would PCORI research on 
this off-label use fit its mission?  It does not seem to fit the priorities set 
by PPACA in creating this institute.  Further, there is an argument that 
prioritizing such research would not be the most efficient or equitable 
use of PCORTF funds.  Considering the above analysis, our proposal sets 
forth two different off-label research tracks for PCORI.  Track One is to 
be initiated by PCORI for “public interest” considerations, and Track 
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Two is to be initiated by pharmaceutical companies seeking validation of 
off-label uses for their drugs. 
1. Track One 
If a drug reaches a certain threshold of off-label usage (by either 
monetary value or percentage of total prescriptions of drug), PCORI 
should initiate drug testing in this case because drug companies have 
little incentive to do further testing in this instance and eliminate “gaps in 
evidence.”  For instance, drugs such as Neurontin and Zyprexa would fit 
this category.
166
  For a company that already has a lucrative off-label 
market presence for its drug, further testing carries significant risk 
because additional testing could reveal that the drug is not safe or 
effective in this additional off-label use. 
The funding for these studies can come from the PCORTF, the 
traditional funding source for PCORI.  There is an equitable rationale for 
funding this type of research from this pool: these payors can benefit 
financially from eliminating unnecessary costs for unproven treatments 
that have a high level of prevalence in the marketplace.  Further, such an 
effort dovetails with PPACA’s promotion of Accountable Care 
Organizations, entities structured to benefit from improved patient 
outcomes and not necessarily from the increased utilization of 
healthcare.
167
 
2. Track Two 
An “orphan disease” is a relatively rare medical condition that the 
pharmaceutical industry has little financial incentive to pursue because 
the cost of full regulatory approval and marketing is not economically 
justified by the size of the market.  For example, in the case of rare 
cancers, existing drugs might be effectively used in an off-label manner, 
but pharmaceutical companies might be wary of promoting these uses 
because the financial payoff might not outweigh the regulatory risk.  
 
 166. See Evans, supra note 23. 
 167. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) defines Accountable 
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Additionally, insurance companies might reject coverage of such uses as 
“experimental.” 
The incentives in this track are reversed from the case described 
above in “Track One,” as a pharmaceutical company would likely want 
additional studies performed on these off-label uses if they could more 
assertively communicate (i.e., market) such information to doctors.  
Therefore, this article proposes a second track of research, “Track Two,” 
which would allow pharmaceutical companies to directly petition PCORI 
to conduct studies on the safety and effectiveness of off-label usages for 
orphan diseases.  In contrast with “Track One,” funding for these studies 
would not come from PCORTF, but user fees paid by the pharmaceutical 
companies.  This method would parallel the model already set up by the 
FDA for clinical drug trials under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act 
(PDUFA).
168
  However, opening up access to PCORI’s research agenda 
by itself is likely not enough incentive for pharmaceutical companies to 
incur such research expenses.  However, as described below, if the FDA 
rules on marketing off-label findings to physicians were relaxed for 
studies generated through PCORI, this could nudge pharmaceutical 
companies to fund such testing.  In this scenario, the drug companies 
face little risk from such testing because they do not currently have a 
large market for such off-label usages, but their reward in the form of 
relaxed marketing rules to doctors could provide enough incentive.  Once 
again, the benefit of conducting such research under the auspices of 
PCORI is readily apparent because it would have to follow rules 
regarding transparency, conflict of interest, and proper methodology. 
D. Research Capacity 
The question remains whether this proposal is feasible given the 
relatively small footprint of PCORI.  If this proposal were implemented, 
it would certainly increase the administrative burden of PCORI.  
However, PPACA anticipates and allows for outsourcing of PCORI 
research outside of the government (e.g., NIH, NSF, and DHHS) to 
academic and private research institutions.
169
  Thus, this proposal is 
feasible to the extent that it would not rely solely on extending the 
federal government’s research capacity.  The additional oversight burden 
of regulating the outsourced research for “Track Two” studies would 
require more administrative resources, but, as described above, user fees 
levied on pharmaceutical sponsors could shoulder this burden. 
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E. Amending FDA Rules on Off-Label Marketing and  Dissemination of 
Research Findings 
If the research process dictated by PCORI cures the legitimacy 
problems currently facing off-label studies, then it seems from a practical 
and First Amendment perspective that the FDA should create a “safe 
harbor” for drug companies more liberally promoting such CER studies 
to doctors.  However, such safe harbor rules should not allow direct-to-
consumer (DTC) marketing because that would undermine any incentive 
drug companies would have to undergo more rigorous sNDA testing.  
Indeed, if a drug company receives positive study results from either 
Track One or Track Two, these results could provide it with more 
incentive to apply for a sNDA in order to open up the possibility of DTC 
marketing. 
F. First Amendment and Commercial Speech 
In either continuing or amending its regulatory ban on off-label 
marketing, the FDA has to consider that it is regulating commercial 
speech that is protected by the First Amendment.  Further, as discussed 
below, the Supreme Court has recently expanded the scope of First 
Amendment protection afforded to corporations.  This substantial change 
makes existing FDA restrictions on off-label marketing vulnerable to 
legal attack by pharma.  
For the last three decades, the four-part test in Central Hudson Gas 
& Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York has 
guided courts on how to determine whether a restriction on commercial 
speech was viable.
170
  The general principle from the test is that truthful 
commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection.  If the 
government attempts to restrict such speech, it needs a substantial 
governmental interest and must directly advance this interest in a 
narrowly tailored fashion.  The government body must prove that “the 
harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them 
to a material degree.”171  Lastly, the government need not use the least 
restrictive means; however, there must be a “reasonable fit between the 
legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends . . . a 
means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.”172  Essentially, 
Central Hudson held that commercial speech regulations should be 
reviewed with an intermediate level of scrutiny, reflecting the inherent 
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differences between commercial and political speech within the First 
Amendment and the government’s broader power to regulate commerce.  
While Central Hudson has not been overruled, with two recent cases, 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
173
 and  Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc.,
174
 it appears that the Court is fundamentally rethinking the 
lower level of protection afforded to commercial speech under Central 
Hudson. 
In the much discussed 2010 ruling in Citizens United, the Court 
expressed disapproval for what it characterized as speaker-based 
discrimination in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA).
175
  The Court ruled that BCRA’s two-tiered approach of 
restricting corporate and union speech, while allowing individual speech, 
unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of “corporate identity.”176  
In applying strict scrutiny to strike down central components of the law, 
the Court explained that the government violated the First Amendment 
because “certain disfavored associations of citizens—those that have 
taken on the corporate form—are penalized for engaging in the same 
political speech” as other entities (individuals and unincorporated 
associations).
177
 
In Sorrell, which was decided in 2011, the Vermont legislature 
passed a regulation that prohibited pharmacies and other regulated 
entities from selling or disseminating prescriber-identifying information 
for marketing.
178
  Vermont argued that it was merely a commercial 
restriction with an incidental burden on protected expression, necessary 
to protect medical privacy, including physician confidentiality, 
avoidance of harassment, and the integrity of the doctor-patient 
relationship.
179
  The Court held the regulation to be more than an 
incidental burden; and, in so determining, the Court decided that the 
statute was not sufficiently narrow or proportional to the asserted interest 
protected.
180
 
Sorrell did not overrule Central Hudson, but the majority opinion 
by Justice Kennedy, who also authored Citizens United, strongly 
suggested that corporate commercial speech might be deserving of the 
same protection as corporate political speech: “A consumer’s concern for 
free flow of commercial speech may often be keener than this concern 
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for urgent political dialogue.”181  Justice Kennedy further analogized 
Vermont’s statute to one that restricted political discourse, “but the State 
may not burden protected expression in order to tilt public debate in a 
preferred direction.”182  
 Thus, the Supreme Court held that speech in aid of pharmaceutical 
marketing is a form of expression protected by the free speech clause of 
the First Amendment.
183
  Furthermore, the Court opened the door for 
drug manufacturers to make the credible legal argument that they have a 
First Amendment right to market off-label uses and that the State has a 
high burden to justify its content-based law as consistent with the First 
Amendment.
184
  Sorrell requires the State’s interests to be proportional to 
the resulting burdens placed on speech and inhibits the law from seeking 
to suppress a disfavored message.
185
 
The proposal set forth in this article seems to pass the heightened 
level of scrutiny in Sorrell.  Here, the government can argue that it has a 
substantial interest in regulating such speech because the FDA can 
empirically demonstrate that drug companies have abused the off-label 
usage research process and have disseminated information that has been 
misleading and harmful to both patients and third-party payors (e.g., 
Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers).  The proposal will openly 
regulate speech (as opposed to commercial activity) and will need to 
survive the heightened scrutiny standard discussed in Sorrell.  Further, it 
is important that imposed restrictions advance this interest in a narrowly 
tailored fashion.  To the extent that the proposal would lessen concerns 
about the legitimacy of off-label research because of PCORI oversight, 
this should consequently lessen the weight of the government’s interest 
in restricting such speech. 
Therefore, the creation of the “safe harbors” (allowing pharma to 
disseminate more freely the results of PCORI testing to doctors on the 
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benefits of off-label usage) is not only justified based on public policy 
initiatives, one could also argue that they might be essential from a First 
Amendment perspective to ensure that factually true speech is not being 
suppressed.  
Indeed, the potential impact of using Sorrell and Citizens United to 
attack FDA restrictions on off-label marketing has not escaped the 
attention of drug makers.  Consequently, going forward, all restrictions 
on pharmaceutical marketing (a protected expression under the First 
Amendment’s free speech clause) must directly advance a substantial 
government interest in a narrowly tailored fashion. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The world of prescription drugs is plagued with a crisis of 
legitimacy.  Although many functional problems exist with the current 
U.S. system of regulating off-label medicine, it all starts with the 
pharmaceutical companies themselves.  Until these companies 
understand that it is their responsibility to act with the utmost candor and 
integrity in their relationships with physicians and patients, they will 
continue to circumvent the FDA approval process and take advantage of 
the system. 
In the United Kingdom (U.K.), a system is in place that is 
substantially regulated by non-government entities and the drug 
manufacturers themselves.
186
  Statutory authority that is very comparable 
to what exists in the U.S. is supplemented with a detailed code of 
practice that helps to remove ambiguity in the law.
187
  Pharmaceutical 
companies have a high level of engagement with the entire process 
because they developed and adopted the code that exists in the U.K.
188
  
These companies regularly examine their business practices, limit the 
extent of their hospitality to MECCs and medical practitioners, and 
exercise influence over other drug manufacturers.
189
  Moreover, 
competitors, former employees, physicians, and patients can bring 
complaints against drug manufacturers for violating the rules and 
regulations against off-label promotion.
190
  As a result, the U.K. has in 
place a transparent system that resolves conflicts expeditiously.
191
 
Such a system is likely not feasible in the U.S. given that one 
central government body serves as the gatekeeper and that the FDA and 
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pharmaceutical companies have never worked in unison to eliminate 
unethical interactions between manufacturers and physicians.  
Nevertheless, there are still valuable takeaways from the U.K. system.  
The U.S. system is in dire need of clarity.  Clarity would make it easier 
for enforcing bodies to prosecute misbehaving drug companies, and the 
defined limitations would allow courts to make straightforward, 
transparent determinations.  By fair application of unambiguous rules, 
and by promoting drug manufacturer awareness of the problems resulting 
from off-label marketing, not only would the amount of federal tax 
dollars spent on off-label drugs be decreased, the incidence rate of health 
concerns stemming from improper off-label prescriptions will assuredly 
be reduced. 
 
